'Starter quotes' from GtI readings

The emotion transcends the present in two ways. It issues from, and it issues towards. It is received, it is enjoyed, and it is passed along, from moment to moment. Each occasion is an activity of concern, in the Quaker sense of that term. It is the conjunction of transcendence and immanence. The occasion is concerned, in the way of feeling and aim, with things that in their essence lie beyond it; although these things in their present functions are factors in the concern of that occasion. Thus each occasion, although engaged in its own immediate self-realization, is concerned with the universe.
Alfred North Whitehead (1938). "Nature Alive" Lecture Eight, in Modes of Thought. (p. 167)

The paradox of the same experience figuring in two consciousnesses seems thus not a paradox at all. To be 'conscious' means not simply to be, but to be reported, known, to have awareness of one's being added to that being; and this is just what happens when the appropriative experience supervenes.
William James (1912). "How Can Two Minds Know One Thing", in Essays in Radical Empiricism.

Obviously, I have a very different kind of delocalization in mind: to bring into existence the experience of here and there, the experience of a here that, by its very topology, affirms the existence of a there, and affirms it in a way that excludes any nostalgia for the possibility of erasing differences, of creating an all-purpose experience. My hypothesis is that the concepts of requirement and obligation can serve as vectors for this experience to the extent that they shift attention from visions of the world and the great metaphysical questions that claim to be valid for each and every one of us, to the singularity of what "matters" here and not somewhere else, to the "technical details" that no one but the practitioners involved would deem worthy of interest but which, for them, are the difference between "worth" and failure.
Isabelle Stengers (2010). "Introductions", in (trans. Robert Bononno) Cosmopolitics I. (p. 62)

Mais plutôt que de sujet, peut-être conviendrait-il de parler de composantes de subjectivation travaillant chacune plus ou moins à leur propre compte. Ce qui conduirait nécessairement à ré-examiner le rapport entre l'individu et la subjectivité et, en tout premier lieu, d'en séparer nettement les concepts. Ces vecteurs de subjectivation ne passent pas nécessairement par l'individu; lequel en réalité, se trouve en position de "terminal" à l'égard des processus impliquant des groupes humains, des ensembles socio-économiques, des machines informationnelles, etc. Ainsi, l'intériorité s'instaure-t-elle au carrefour de multiples composantes relativement autonomes les unes par rapport aux autres et, le cas échéant, franchement discordantes.
Félix Guattari (1989). Les trois écologies. (p. 24)